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In his Opinion of 8 July 2021 in Case C-132/20 Getin Noble Bank, AG Bobek
advised the Court of Justice (ECJ) to find admissible a national request for a
preliminary ruling originating from an individual who was appointed to Poland’s
Supreme Court (SC) on the back of manifest and grave irregularities. In this specific
case, contrary to the position of AG Bobek, we submit that the ECJ must find the
request inadmissible as the referring individual cannot be considered a tribunal
established by law.
The nature of the problem
The referring individual at issue was appointed to Poland’s SC following:
(i) the personal intervention of the Minister of Justice at the time where this individual
worked at the Ministry of Justice;
(ii) a resolution adopted by a body suspended by the European Network of Councils
for the Judiciary and found by both the ECJ and the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) not to provide sufficient guarantees of independence with this
resolution furthermore recently quashed by Poland’s Supreme Administrative Court
(SAC); and
(iii) the deliberate and flagrant violation by the Polish President of a freezing order of
Poland’s SAC adopted on 25 September 2018.
These irregularities are, sadly, no longer the exception but the rule in Poland.
Indeed, as aptly summarised by Adam Bodnar, Poland’s Ombudsman until 15 July
2021, the multiple legislative changes adopted by Polish authorities since the end
of 2015 have created “an alternative legal space […] under which the ruling majority
can enact unconstitutional laws, unlawfully appoint members of the Constitutional
Tribunal, the National Council of the Judiciary, the Supreme Court”.
The unprecedented nature of the problem faced by the ECJ was fittingly outlined by
AG Tanchev on 15 April 2021 in W.# and M.F, which is primarily about the manifestly
irregular appointments of two individuals to two new organisational units in the SC
known as the ECJ-once suspended Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public
Affairs (CECPA) and the ECJ-twice suspended Disciplinary Chamber (DC). As
noted by AG Tanchev, the Polish President committed a twofold violation of the
Polish Constitution when he manifestly and deliberately violated the SAC’s order
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referred above. We are therefore dealing here with several flagrant breaches “of the
rules of national law governing the appointment procedure for judges” when those
rules are interpreted in conformity with EU law, with the gravity of these breaches
“more serious than the irregularities at issue in Ástráðsson v. Iceland”. It is worth
stressing that these breaches also concern all of the individuals appointed to the
Civil Chamber post 2017, including the referring individual in Case C-132/20.
In light inter alia of the grave irregularities which “inherently tarnished” the
appointment procedure, one can expect the ECtHR to find that these individuals,
sitting alone or in benches, do not satisfy the requirements relating to the right to
an independent tribunal established by law. Since the same requirements also exist
in EU Law, they can be similarly considered to have been manifestly violated as a
matter of EU Law.
AG Bobek’s suggested solution
In his Opinion of 8 July 2021, AG Bobek suggests the ECJ to find admissible the
national request for a preliminary ruling submitted by an individual who, prior to
his (manifestly irregular) appointment to the SC, was a department director at the
Ministry of Justice and was never a judge to begin with. For AG Bobek, the manifest
and deliberate violation of the SAC order committed by the Polish President in order
to make the appointment of the referring individual a fait accompli does not suffice to
make the reference inadmissible.
Based on the starting premise that Article 267 procedures would establish judicial
cooperation between courts and not between individual judges, benches or even
chambers within national courts, the AG suggests the following approach: (i) the
ECJ should assess admissibility in light of the nature, position and functioning of
the overall national referring court; (ii) provided that the overall court from which the
preliminary ruling request originates has not been “hijacked”, the ECJ should not find
the request inadmissible.
AG Bobek admits that this may well result in a situation where the ECJ could answer
questions from a body whose subsequent ruling could be held to violate Article
19(1) TEU and/or Article 47 CFR due to the possible flaws in the appointment of the
referring individual and/or his alleged personal and professional ties to the Minister
for Justice/General Prosecutor. Indeed, for AG Bobek, while there is “only one
principle of judicial independence”, the “intensity of the Court’s review with regard
to compliance with that principle and the threshold for detecting an infringement
thereto” should vary.
Similarly, the AG suggests to apply the concept of “tribunal established by law”
differently in situations governed by Article 267 TFEU from situations where Article
47 CFR applies as in “the latter case, the examination of the lawfulness of the
composition of the bench must naturally reach the level of individual cases”. By
contrast, when it comes to Article 267 TFEU, the AG is of the opinion that the ECJ
ought to limit itself to an examination of the overall situation of the judicial body the
reference originates from.
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To sum up, AG Bobek proposes a “decoupling” when it comes to the application
of the notions which Article 267 TFEU and Articles 19(1) TEU/47 CFR have in
common, and the introduction of a new “hijacked” threshold to reject requests from
referring bodies under Article 267 TFEU.
The problems with the suggested solution
The ECJ has repeatedly and rightly emphasised that the independence of national
courts and tribunals is essential to the proper working of the judicial cooperation
system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU. This
means that this mechanism may be activated only by a body responsible for applying
EU law which satisfies, inter alia, that criterion of independence.
While the ECJ is yet to similarly emphasise the fundamental importance of the
“established by law” criterion when it comes to the proper working of Article 267
TFEU, its case law also makes clear that this mechanism may be activated only by
a body which also satisfies the requirements relating to this criterion. As a matter
of ECHR but also EU law, “established by law” does not merely cover the issue of
the legal basis for the very existence of the relevant tribunal but also covers the
specific composition of the bench in each case and any other provision of domestic
law which, if breached, would render the participation of one or more judges in the
examination of a case irregular. For both the ECtHR and the ECJ, “established by
law” encompasses, by its very nature, the process of appointing judges. As regards
appointment decisions specifically, it is in particular necessary for the substantive
conditions and detailed procedural rules governing the adoption of those decisions
to be such that they cannot give rise to such reasonable doubts with respect to the
judges appointed.
In addition, the ECJ has interpreted the notions, principles and requirements Article
267 TFEU, Article 47(2) CFR and Article 19(1) TEU have in common in a similar
fashion. For instance, the meaning of “tribunal” under Article 47(2) CFR is the same
as the meaning of “court or tribunal” under Article 267 TFEU. Similarly, the ECJ
has interpreted the requirement of judicial independence on the basis of Article 267
TFEU in the light of what is set out in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
Notably, in its landmark ruling in the Portuguese Judges case, the Court explicitly
linked the requirement of independence under Article 19(1) with the preliminary
ruling procedure. Conversely, when assessing whether a referring body is a “court or
tribunal” under Article 267 TFEU, the Court itself refers to its case law regarding both
Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter (see e.g. Banco de Santander).
Consequently, it would be misguided or at the very least, inconsistent with existing
case law to apply the concept of court and associated criterion such as established
by law or judicial independence under Article 267 TFEU differently (i.e., more laxly)
from situations where Article 47(2) CFR or Article 19(1) TEU apply. Yet this is what
AG Bobek seemingly suggests by advocating an approach which focuses on the
referring court as a whole rather than the specific referring judge(s) or even the
internal units which the referring judges may belong to.
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Why is this, with respect, a flawed approach?
In a nutshell, it would lead to situations where the ECJ would accept to answer
questions from national referring bodies, which the ECJ would find “established by
law” for the purpose of Article 267 TFEU but whose judgments could subsequently
be challenged on the ground inter alia that they were issued by a “judge” or a bench
irregularly composed in breach of the “established by law” requirement guaranteed
under Article 47(2) CFR/Article 19(1) TEU (and Article 6(1) ECHR in any subsequent
eventual complaint to Strasbourg). In other words, you could end up with a body
which is held by the ECJ to be enough of a “court” to submit questions to it but
not enough of a “court” (due to e.g. not being established by law) to issue proper
judgments as a matter of EU law and in particular, the principle of effective judicial
protection.
In addition, while AG Bobek argues that his approach would not lead to different
meanings of the same principles such as “established by law”, in practice, we would
end up with several definitions of the same principles rather than merely different
types of examination or levels of scrutiny from the Court depending on the Treaty
provision at play. For instance, when Article 267 TFEU is at issue, “established by
law” would no longer cover the issue of the specific composition of the bench in each
case (since the AG suggests an examination at the level of the overall court only in
this situation) while in a case where Article 47 CFR is at issue, this aspect may be
assessed as part of the “established by law” criterion.
Let us briefly mention some potential scenarios: AG Bobek’s suggested approach
would compel the ECJ to find admissible a preliminary request from irregularly
appointed members of Poland’s CT even though the ECtHR has already held
this body not to be a “tribunal established by law” when it sits in a panel/formation
including one of the individuals irregularly appointed to it by Polish President Duda.
One must note in this respect that the ECtHR is likely to similarly find the Civil
Chamber of the SC – where the referring individual in Case C-132/20 sits – not to
constitute a tribunal established by law when it rules in formations which include any
of the “judges” manifestly irregularly appointed to it (see pending Case of Advance
Pharma). And were the ECJ to follow AG Tanchev in Case C-487/19 and make
clear that a court composed of a single person of the CECPA of Poland’s Supreme
Court does not meet the requirements to constitute such a tribunal established by
law under Articles 19(1) TEU/47 CFR, the same person would still be able to submit
Article 267 requests were the ECJ to follow AG Bobek.
With respect to his proposed new hijacking test, AG Bobek suggests to look at the
accumulation of issues such as “appointments to that (formally judicial) institution,
the political influence being exercised over its decision-making” which “reveal a
pattern in which there is no longer any independent court worth the name”. In doing
so, AG Bobek reintroduces the issue of problematic judicial appointment into the mix
while not providing us with practical examples. It is therefore unclear for instance
whether he would agree to view the unlawfully composed Polish CT as sufficiently
captured to reject any Article 267 reference originating from it. The AG also does
not specifically discuss the current situation of the Polish SC which is now inter alia
presided by an “unlawful judge” whose latest action and recent public interview
- 4 -
could not make clearer her contempt for the ECJ’s authority and her complete
subservience to the executive.
Should we consider the current SC already sufficiently hijacked or should we wait
for it to consist of, say, 51% of fake judges overall to reject all Article 267 requests
originating from it? What is the threshold? And if there is no threshold, if this is to
be assessed on a case-by-case basis, how can there be any legal certainty in the
solution proposed by AG Bobek? Furthermore, AG Bobek insists on “the value of
an ongoing dialogue” between courts. But once this (elusive) threshold is reached,
no judge within a court would be able to request the Court for a preliminary ruling,
whether they have been irregularly nominated/appointed or not. Does it not defeat
the purpose of judicial dialogue even more than a judge-by-judge assessment?
In light of the above, the ECJ should not follow AG Bobek’s approach because,
in the short term, it would a) end up legitimising a manifestly irregularly appointed
individual by artificially assessing admissibility at the level of the SC and b) pave
the way for the potential rejection of all Article 267 requests, including from the few
independent judges who may then still be left, should the ECJ find the SC said
to be hijacked (which, in fact, has already happened). Instead, the ECJ must find
inadmissible every preliminary ruling request originating from any of the individuals
(some of whom were never judges to begin with) appointed in breach of the SAC’s
freezing orders on the ground that these individuals cannot be considered a tribunal
established by law.
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